

Message Text

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CU-04 EB-11 STR-08 AGR-20 CIEP-02 COME-00 DRC-01 /198 W

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INFO ALL CSCE CAPITALS 69

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

USNMR SHAPR

USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH

USLO SACLANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 6524

E.O.11652 GDS

TAGS PFOR

SUBJ CSCE REVIEW: PART V - HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION

SUMMARY. THE OUTCOME OF CSCE IS LESS CLEAR IN THE AREA OF HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION, WHICH IS ALSO THE MOST VITAL TO THE WEST, THAN IN ANY OTHER AREA. THREE MONTHS OF DEBATE HAVE FAILED TO REVEAL--ALTHOUGH THIS IS NOT SURPRISING--ANY RELIABLE SIGN OF SOVIET RECEPTIVITY TO PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD MEANINGFULLY CONTRIBUTE TO FREER COMMUNICATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THE EAST IMPLIES THAT IT WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IF THE WEST WILL AGREE TO AN "UMBRELLA" OF SAFEGUARDING PRINCIPLES OVER THE SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS, AN UMBRELLA WHICH THE WEST IN TURN FEARS IS MEANT TO ROB THESE AGREEMENTS OF ANY MEANING. HOW FAR THE
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SOVIETS WILL BE PREPARED TO GO WILL PROBABLY ONLY BE KNOWN AT THE CONFERENCE'S ELEVENTH HOUR, AND IT MAY WELL BE THAT ONLY THE PERCEPTION OF A CREDIBLE THREAT THAT THE CONFERENCE MAY OTHERWISE FAIL WILL LEAD TO ANY SOVIET CONCESSIONS OF SUBSTANCE.

END SUMMARY.

1. REVIEW OF WORK TO DATE. AFTER MORE THAN THIRTY-FIVE MEETINGS OF EACH OF THE FOUR SUBCOMMITTEES, NINE MEETINGS OF THE FULL COMMITTEE, AND HUNDREDS OF INFORMAL CONTACTS, SOVIETS' READINESS TO MAKE ANY MEANINGFUL CONCESSIONS IN THE GENERAL FIELD OF HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION HAS NOT YET BEEN PROVEN. MOREOVER, FOR PREDICTABLE NEGOTIATING REASONS, THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO SHOW THEIR HAND IN THIS HIGHLY SENSITIVE AREA UNTIL LATE IN DRAFTING STAGE OF CONFERENCE, WHEN TRADE-OFF POSSIBILITIES HAVE EMERGED IN CLEARER FORM. MEANWHILE, DURING EXTENSIVE GENERAL DISCUSSIONS OF HELSINKI RECOMMENDATIONS, EAST HAS PRESSED FOR ACCEPTANCE OF AN "UMBRELLA" OF PRINCIPLES TO GOVERN SPECIFIC AGREED MEASURES IN THIS FIELD, CITING IN THIS RESPECT SOVEREIGN EQUALITY, NON-INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND RESPECT FOR "LAWS AND CUSTOMS" OF PARTICIPATING STATES. WEST TO DATE HAS VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED ANY PREAMBULAR CAVEATS AS BEING BOTH UNNECESSARY AND UNDESIRABLE, ESPECIALLY AS THEY WOULD RAISE DOUBTS REGARDING EASTERN IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIFIC AGREED MEASURES.

2. WHILE PROFESSING READINESS TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN THIS AREA ONCE THEIR REQUIREMENTS FOR A PREAMBLE ARE MET, EASTERN DELEGATIONS (WITH EXCEPTION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND ROMANIA) HAVE SHOWN NO RECEPTIVITY TO ANY SIGNIFICANT WESTERN PROPOSAL. THEY REPEATEDLY CALL ATTENTION TO RECENT USSR AND GDR RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AS EVIDENCE OF GOOD INTENTIONS. SIGNIFICANTLY, COMMITMENTS IN KEY AREAS OF THESE CONVENTIONS ALLOW FOR SUCH BROAD RESTRICTIONS ON BASIC RIGHTS AS TO, IN EFFECT, SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE THE RIGHTS THEMSELVES, AND NEITHER USSR NOR GDR HAS INDICATED THAT IT INTENDS TO, OR NEEDS TO, EFFECT ANY INTERNAL CHANGE AS A RESULT OF THEIR ADHERENCE TO THE COVENANTS.

3. THE WEST HAS PUT FORWARD A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS COVERING MOST ASPECTS OF THE HELSINKI RECOMMENDATIONS (EC-NINE PLAN TO TABLE SOME ADDITIONAL PAPERS IN THE NEAR FUTURE) AND HAVE DEFENDED THEM VIGOROUSLY. SOVIETS HAVE ENDORSED IN PRINCIPLE THE UK PROPOSAL
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FOR AN INTERNATIONAL MAGAZINE (WHICH US OPPOSED PRIVATELY) AND SOME INNOCUOUS PARTS OF OTHER PROPOSALS. THEY HAVE SHOWN NO SYMPATHY FOR THE FAMILY PACKAGE (REUNIFICATION, MARRIAGES, AND VISITS ACROSS BORDERS); MEANINGFUL LANGUAGE ON FREER FLOW OF INFORMATIONAL AND CULTURAL MATERIALS; WORKING CONDITIONS FOR THE MEDIA; CLOSED AREAS; CULTURAL CENTERS/LIBRARIES OF ANY TYPE; OR RELAXED CONTROLS ON THE TRAVEL OF SCHOLARS AND STUDENTS AND GREATER ACCESS BY THEM TO ARCHIVAL MATERIALS. THEY HAVE SUGGESTED THAT SOME OF THESE PROBLEM AREAS SHOULD BE HANDLED IN BILATERAL CHANNELS AND IN GENERAL HAVE CLUNG TENACIOUSLY TO HIGHLY GENERALIZED AND UNACCEPTABLE BULGARIAN/POLISH PROPOSAL TABLED IN HELSINKI ON JULY 5.

4. DISCUSSIONS IN COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITTEES HAVE BECOME MORE SPECIFIC SINCE ADOPTION IN LATE NOVEMBER OF FRENCH/AUSTRIAN/SWISS PROPOSAL FOR "CATALOGS" LISTING ALL PROPOSALS UNDER APPROPRIATE PARAGRAPHS OF HELSINKI RECOMMENDATIONS (INCLUDING BULGARIA/POLISH PREAMBULAR PROPOSAL). THESE DISCUSSIONS, HOWEVER, HAVE NOT RESULTED IN ANY MODIFICATIONS IN GENERAL EASTERN POSITIONS. IT IS CLEAR THAT SOVIET OBJECTIVE REMAINS PREPARATION OF ONE CONCISE "FINAL DOCUMENT" LARGELY GENERAL AND DECLARATORY IN NATURE AND HEADED BY A PREAMBLE STRESSING CULTURAL COOPERATION (TO DETRIMENT OF HUMAN CONTACTS AND INFORMATION) AND CONTAINING SOME REFERENCE TO PRINCIPLES. IN CONTRAST, WESTERN DELEGATIONS HAVE ARGUED FOR MORE FLEXIBLE DOCUMENTS INCORPORATING AGREEMENTS ON VARIETY OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS.

5. CENTRAL ISSUES.

A. GENERAL. AS INDICATED ABOVE, OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO OBTAIN LANGUAGE SHOWING THAT THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO LOOSEN UP IN AT LEAST SOME OF THE FOLLOWING AREAS: THE FAMILY PACKAGE; WORKING CONDITIONS FOR JOURNALISTS AND OTHER MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES; CLOSED AREAS; FREER FLOW OF INFORMATION; EXPANDED FREEDOM TO TRAVEL; AND ESTABLISHMENT OF CULTURAL CENTERS/LIBRARIES IN THE EAST. FOR THE FINAL DOCUMENTS TO BE MEANINGFUL AND TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR POLITICAL AND MORAL PRESSURE, ANY PREAMBULAR CAVEATS GIVEN IN RETURN MUST BE HELD AT OR NEAR THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES AS SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 19 OF THE HELSINKI RECOMMENDATIONS, AND NOT RESTATED SO FREQUENTLY THAT THEY OVERSHADOW THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SPECIFIC AGREED MEASURES. THIS QUESTION OF A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN A PREAMBLE OF SOME KIND AND AT LEAST SOME CONFIDENTIAL

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MEANINGFUL SPECIFIC MEASURES IS ONE OF THE MAJOR ISSUES WHICH WILL CONFRONT THE WEST AFTER THE CHRISTMAS RECESS.

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INFO ALL CSCE CAPITALS 70
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
FUFRRSHH/USDOCOSOUTH
USLO SACLANT

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WHILE THE WEST HAS NOT YET OFFICIALLY ACCEPTED A PREAMBLE, ACCEPTANCE OF "CATALOG" PROPOSAL CITED ABOVE CLEARLY KEPT DOOR OPEN FOR EVENTUAL ADOPTION OF ONE. A NUMBER OF WESTERN DELEGATIONS HAVE ALREADY PRIVATELY CONCEDED THAT ONE WILL PROBABLY BE WORKED OUT, BUT THERE IS NO AGREEMENT YET ON ITS FORM OR SUBSTANCE OR ON TACTICS TO BE EMPLOYED IN CONCEDEDING IT TO THE SOVIETS. EC-NINE WILL NOT COME TO GRIPS WITH THIS QUESTION UNTIL THEIR SCHEDULED MEETING IN BONN JAN 7-9, AND IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THEY WILL RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES ON THIS ISSUE EVEN THEN.

B. RL/RFE. THE US HAS A SPECIAL PROBLEM ON RADIO LIBERTY/ RADIO FREE EUROPE (RL/RFE). THE SOVIETS HAVE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS EXPRESSED A DETERMINATION TO INCLUDE LANGUAGE BARRING THEM. THE ATTACK HAS BEEN ON "THOSE COUNTRIES PERMITTING CONFIDENTIAL

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THEM TO EXIST ON THEIR SOIL." US DELEGATION HAS CARRIED THE DEFENSE OF THE RADIOS WITH ENDORSEMENTS ONLY FROM THE UK AND, ON ONE OCCASION, FROM THE FRG. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT A SOVIET TRADE-OFF INVOLVING RL/RFE AND SOME OF THE MORE APPEALING ELEMENTS LISTED ABOVE WOULD BE ATTRACTIVE TO WESTERN AND NEUTRAL COUNTRIES. C. UK INTERNATIONAL MAGAZINE. ANOTHER POTENTIAL AREA FOR DECISION IS THE UK-PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL MAGAZINE. WHILE THE US HAS OPPOSED THIS FROM ITS GENESIS IN NATO, IT NOW IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED AND UNDOUBTEDLY WILL BE IN THE FINAL PACKAGE IN SOME FORM WITH DETAILS TO BE LEFT IN LARGE PART TO BE WORKED OUT BY SPECIALISTS. WE HAVE EXPRESSED OUR OBJECTIONS IN NATO CAUCUSES AND NOT IN FORMAL SESSIONS, IN THE INTEREST OF NATO SOLIDARITY. WHILE THE FINAL FORM OF THE MAGAZINE AND ITS INFRA-STRUCTURE MAY NOT BE FIRM FOR SOME TIME AFTER THE CONFERENCE, AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON THE MAGAZINE MAY WELL BE ONE OF THE FEW IMPORTANT SYMBOLS OF CSCE RESULTS. WE THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT THE US WOULD FIND IT AWKWARD TO REFUSE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PLANNING AND, IF IT EVENTUALLY MATERIALIZES, IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE MAGAZINE.

6. LIKELY OUTCOME. THE OUCOME IN THE HUMANITARIANCOOPERATION AREA IS MORE UNCERTAIN--AND MORE CRUCIAL TO THE WEST-- THAN IN ANY OTHER AREA OF THE CONFERENCE. THE WEST'S OBJECTIVES

ARE REALISTICALLY MODEST BUT, AS THE EC STRATEGY PAPER EMPHASIZES, IT WANTS CONCRETE RESULTS, NOT AMBIGUOUS DECLARATIONS OR RESULTS WITHOUT PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE. IN GENERAL, IT SEEKS TO INDUCE THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES TO MOVE TOWARD A GRADUAL RELAXATION OF THEIR RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES AND TO OBTAIN THEIR COOPERATION IN IMPROVING CONTACTS. BUT GIVEN THE DISPOSITION OF SOME OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO SLIDE TOWARD SOVIET POSITIONS AND THE WEST'S DIFFICULTY IN FORMULATING IRREDUCIBLE OBJECTIVES, IT MAY PROVE HARD TO DEVELOP SUFFICIENT PRESSURE TO FORCE THE EAST TO YIELD EVEN THESE MODEST RESULTS OR INDEED ANYTHING THAT IS MEANINGFUL IN THIS KEY AREA. SOME WESTERN DELEGATES COUNT ON PRESSURES BUILDING UP ON THE SOVIET UNION, GIVEN ITS STRONG DESIRE FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE DRAFTING PHASE BY LATE SPRING AND THE CONVOCAION OF A SUMMIT MEETING TO SIGN THE AGREED DOCUMENT IN JUNE OR JULY, SUFFICIENT TO IMPEL IT TO MAKE SOME MODEST CONCESSIONS IN A LAST MINUTE TRADE-OFF NEXT SPRING. ANY SUCH CONCESSIONS ARE THOUGHT MORE LIKELY IN THE FAMILY REUNIFICATION AREA, AND LEAST LIKELY CONFIDENTIAL

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WITH RESPECT TO THE FLOW OF INFORMATION INTO THE EAST. BUT THESE EXPECTATIONS MAY BE SHOWN TO ILLUSORY, IN WHICH CASE THE MOST LIKELY RESULT WILL BE A COMPROMISE FINAL DOCUMENT WHICH WILL INCLUDE A PREAMBULAR REFERENCE TO THE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES EMERGING FROM COMMITTEE I AND WHICH WILL BE REplete WITH GENERAL DECLARATIONS OF A LARGELY HORTATORY AND PERMISSIVE NATURE ON A VARIETY OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS. SUCH A RESULT WOULD BE WIDELY CRITICIZED BY WESTERN MEDIA AND EMIGRE GROUPS. THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS, IF THEY ARE FACED WITH THAT PROSPECT, MAY BE FORCED TO CONSIDER WHETHER THEY HAVE A STRONGER INTEREST IN A "SUCCESSFUL CONFERENCE" IN TERMS OF THEIR BROADER INTERESTS VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION OR IN AVOIDING THE DOMESTIC CRITICISM THAT A BLAND AND MEANINGLESS OUTCOME IN THE HUMANITARIAN AREA WOULD PROVOKE. IT MAY BE THAT ONLY THE USSR'S PERCEPTION OF A STRONG THREAT THAT CSCE MIGHT FAIL OR BE PROLONGED INDEFINITELY WOULD LEAD IT TO MAKE THE MODEST CONCESSIONS NECESSARY FOR BOTH SIDES TO REGARD CSCE AS WORTHWHILE. IN ANY CASE, WE DOUBT THAT SOVIETS AT THIS TIME AND EVEN GIVEN STRONG PRESSURE WOULD ACCEPT ANY PRACTICAL MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE PERCEIVED AS CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNAL LIBERALIZATION IN USSR.

7. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US POSITION. GIVEN THE UNDERLYING IDENTITY OF OUR APPROACHES, AT LEAST IN THE INITIAL PHASE, WE HAVE GENERALLY FOLLOWED THE LEAD OF THE EC-NINE IN THIS AREA. DURING THE CHRISTMAS RECESS, THE NINE WILL SEEK TO FORMULATE INTERIM POSITIONS FOR PRESENTATION TO THEIR NATO ALLIES IN GENEVA IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE REOPENING OF CSCE IN MID-JANUARY AND THEN TO THE CONFERENCE ITSELF, ASSUMING NATO AGREEMENT. WE EXPECT THAT THESE POSITIONS WILL BE IN LINE WITH OUR OWN OBJECTIVES IN THE KEY AREAS. THE SPECIAL US ROLE, GIVEN THE MODEST AND CONCILIATORY POSTURE IT HAS ADOPTED AT CSCE, MAY BE TO HELP BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN THE MORE EXTREME POSITIONS AND TO

HELP FIND CONCRETE IF MODEST MEASURES ON WHICH AGREEMENT WILL
BE POSSIBLE. THE MOST DIFFICULT CHOICE MAY WELL BE PRESENTED
TO US IN THE DRAFTING STAGE WHEN THE CHIPS ARE FINALLY BEING
PLAYED AND WHEN WE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE TO TAKE A STAND
EITHER WITH THOSE WESTERN COUNTRIES DETERMINED TO HOLD THE LINE
(THE UK, NETHERLANDS, AND CANADA, FOR EXAMPLE) OR WITH THE MORE
CONCILIATORY OF OUR ALLIES WHO MAY PROVE WILLING TO ACCEPT
LARGELY MEANINGLESS RESULTS. AS ONLY STRONG INSISTENCE ON
"CONCRETE RESULTS" IS LIKELY TO PRODUCE ANYTHING WORTHWHILE FROM
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THE SOVIETS, WE MAY NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THOSE DELE-
GATIONS WILLING TO TAKE A FIRMER LINE.BASSIN

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